Showing posts with label stock exchange. Show all posts
Showing posts with label stock exchange. Show all posts

Sunday, 1 July 2018

Half-year musings on economy

Late June. The time of year when days are the longest and it is a shame to stay indoors while the sunlight is out until 9 p.m. or later. After nine hours spent in the office and some household chores, there are still two hours left to enjoy the beginning of the summer.

On Wednesday I went to a swimming pool, for the first time since ages not during the weekend (few people had the same idea), on Thursday I took a bike and rode over 30 kilometres, making ac circle around Chopin Airport, which in a decade might be non-operational if idiotic plans of building a giant transport hub half-way between Warsaw and Łódź are carried through. The ride was a good time to ponder on the current state of economy, on macro and micro level.

The press reports say despite the rising crude oil prices, summer of 2018 will go down as the time of cheap airplane tickets. Checked out some offers at Wizzair’s webpage to learn the prices are indeed quite attractive. As it can be witnessed, tight competition exerts pressure on margins, which in the long run will not be beneficial for travellers. The weaker airlines might not withstand the price war and might easily go under or be taken over by stronger competitors. With fewer flight operators on the market, competitive pressure can ease and the era of low prices might draw to a close. On the other hand, prophets of doom have outlined such scenarios for many years and despite some bankruptcies cheap flight are still easy to find.

Although for nearly four years I have kept my savings away from the stock market, nor even investment funds, I recently began to keep track of stock market performance. WIG, the broad-market index of the Warsaw Stock Exchange on Thursday was 19% down from its peak reached in the third decade of January 2018. It rebounded on Friday, but the 5-month rate of return is below -17%. After one or two trading days marked with red colour, the broad-market index can enter the territory of bear market (20% decline from peak). Several factors bring stock prices down: fear of trade wars (say thank you to the insane president), fears of global economic slowdown, but also imminent lower GDP growth dynamics in Poland, as the peak is by all accounts behind.

I cycled past the recently built housing estates in Mordor and near ul. Kłobucka within the borders of Ursynów. New blocks of flats are erected between recently built ones. Proximity of the airport, S79 expressway, railway tracks, prison and old warehouses, lack of decent infrastructure and public transport links, high density of development are crucial downsides of that location, but despite that flats are selling like hot cakes out there, even before construction commences. Second-hand (nearly new) flats in the area have asking prices in the range of PLN 10-12k, same as in areas of Ursynów superbly linked to the city centre by underground. Nevertheless, data from residential primary market show 2% q/q and 2% y/y decline on six biggest markets, shows the demand is not infinite and buyers are sensitive to price hike. On the other hand, the recent NBP report shows profit margin of developers have not shrunk despite rising costs of building materials and shortages of labour force.

Sales of brand-new automobiles still rise, but the growing supply of 3-4-year old used (mostly post-lease) cars constitutes an alternative to a purchase of a brand-new vehicle. Though I personally see several drawbacks of such cars, many people will go for a used cars which cost half (or less) of what they would have to pay to drive out of dealer’s showroom as first owners of a shiny vehicle. Car dealers’ sales targets are exorbitant, besides stocks of unsold cars are rising, so the tensions in among distributors begin to emerge.

Last week the central bank of Czech Republic jacked up interest rates for the fourth time in a year. Currently the benchmark rate is 1%, still 0.5 percentage points below the benchmark rate in Poland, yet it has to be noted the central bank of Poland’s southern neighbour is acting ahead of inflationary pressures and overheating economy and cools it down, while it is going strong and easily absorbs the higher cost of money.

Lessons from the crisis have not been learnt. I recently heard property prices in Denmark rose by 100% since 2012, so a classic bubble has emerged there. Reasons: firstly, negative interest rates, secondly, adjustable-rate (interest-only for up to 10 years) mortgages, in which a borrower pays only interest (laughably low), but principal repayments begin after 10 years. Such product, similar to toxic mortgages which a decade ago blew over the US economy and spilt worldwide, is a ticking time bomb, waiting to go off. Frotunately, in terms of mortgage lending regulatory constraints in Poland are far tighter and ward off a serious crisis.

One only ought to bear in mind nothing lasts forever. The business cycle theories still hold true and after a few years of boom time of growth deceleration ensues inevitably. This should be borne in mind and taken into account while taking forward-looking decisions.

Sunday, 13 December 2015

Market update

Customarily, December on financial markets is hardly ever a season of bloodshed. Either everyone is celebrating, trading volumes are thin and markets are placid or fund managers are make use of shallow market to boost portfolio valuations before year-end. This year Santa Claus rally, if it is witnessed at all, will be at best considered a revival after the recent turbulent weeks.

The most frequently benchmark used for the Polish stock market its is large-cap index, WIG20, composed of twenty biggest, in terms of the market value, publicly traded companies in Poland. The index, with its historical high of more than 3,900 points recorded in October 2007 and this decade’s high of more than 2,900 in April 2011, has seen a few months of dreadful performance. In early May this year WIG20 peaked at 2,558 points, while on F11 December’s market close it dropped to mere 1,757 points, so it declined by 31% over 7 months. Raw numbers in theory should not bear a false testimony, yet what underlies the numbers might be biased enough to prompt market data recipients to jump to conclusions.

So before we do this, three facts:
- as of 11 December 2015’s close, WIG20 components accounted for 27.6% of the whole stock market in Poland, in terms of market capitalisation,
- the index is dominated by two industries: financial sector (Alior Bank, Bank Zachodni WBK, mBank, Pekao S.A., PKO BP, PZU) and energy (Enea, Energa, PGE, Tauron),
- the index is a price index, i.e. takes into account only price movements, but fails to account for return from dividends, while the yield of the index in the long-run is close to risk-free return or slightly higher.

The first arguments persuades you to think of another, more representative benchmark for the Polish stock market, the second should tell you performance of two industries might substantially affect performance of the index.

And indeed, the shares of banks and the insurer have been falling for the recent months, as valuations discounted imposition of financial sector tax, higher bank guarantee fund contributions as well as anticipated, yet for a while put back, conversion of FX-denominated loans unfavourable for banks.

Shares of energy producers plummeted because of their planned involvement in the bail-out of coal mining, extensive CAPEX needs, both factors trimming down their dividend payout capacity.

Shares of banks dropped by 30% since May 2015, shares of utilities declined by 40% since May 2015. Besides, two vital components of the index are KGHM, punched by falling copper and silver prices (not well offset by stronger USD) and Bogdanka, thumped by falling hard coal prices. No wonder then even if other 8 companies perform decently (difficult, if the market is perceived as homogenous by foreign investors), the index could not fare well…

The better representative of the broader market is WIG. While WIG20 retracted to levels last seen in April 2009, during post-crisis rally, WIG, a total-return index (takes into account dividend income), is two times higher than in February 2009, but fell by 23% from its peak in May 2015, meaning the Warsaw Stock Exchange has officially entered the bear market.

A justified question is whether the factors depressing Polish equities are of local or global nature. If you look at performance of S&P 500, no pattern similar to what has observed in Poland can be discerned.

The same if you peek at DAX30. Both Wall Street and Frankfurt contracted at the news of faltering Chinese economy, but both are still in bull market.

If the stock exchange predicts troubles in the future, it begins to do when the troubles emerge on the horizon and they did so in May 2015, when lots of market participants realised PO was bound to lose the parliamentary election and PiS, as they got hold of power, would tamper with the economy. Policies pursued by PO were also to blame, as they also had put forward a draft of FX-denominated mortgages conversion and they set off to exploit energy companies to rescue insolvent coal mines.

With hindsight I am grateful to the New Factory for imposing stringent trading restrictions on me which have put me off trading and prompted to terminate my brokerage account. Had the limitations not been in place, I would have several times attempted to catch the falling knife. With hindsight, I see I would have been worse off.

Moving away from Poland… Prices of Brent Oil (traded in London), after bottoming out early this year, have been falling since early summer, but recently they tumbled, best evidenced by the 9% drop within the last week. Excess of oil supply is likely to persist, extraction is unlikely to be cut down by OPEC members, while macroeconomic environment remains shaky. All these factors combined ward off the scenario of crude oil prices drifting to where they were before November 2014.

And a quick glance at the copper. Quotations of the commodity have been in the downward trend for nearly five years and had a tremendous impact on market price of KGHM shares (in early 2013 it trade above 190 PLN per share, today mere 61 PLN would buy such security). Now the Polish copper behemoth is nearing the verge of breaking even, while the promises of lifting the copper tax, made by PiS ahead of the election, are up in the air.

The Polish currency, at least in comparison with our stock market, is holding up relatively well. EUR/PLN pair, as dull as ditchwater over the last three years, has climbed towards 4.40 and forges ahead to break out from the range within which it stayed for too long.

USD/PLN, far more volatile than EUR/PLN, began its ascent in 3Q2014 and in early December 2015 crossed the level of 4.00. It deserves to be stressed however, that the driver of the incline is on the USD side of the pair. The American currency is sent up by buoyant US economy, dwindling commodity prices (negative correlation) and expected interest rate hike (FED meeting due in the coming week).

Unfortunately, I am not a future-teller and even if I were, I would not dare to advise you how to reap profits from what is happening on the markets. Given high expenditures in the offing, I am keeping all my savings at banks. But even with longer investment horizon, I would not bet on stock market recovery. Fundamentally the Polish economy is holding strong, but the extent to which it can be spoilt by zipperheads behind the wheel is unknown. By analogy, in first half of 2008 everyone thought given good economic situation, the bear market should have drawn to a close and stock valuations were bound for correction. Over the next months they fell by some 50%. What I am rather confident is that if WIG slides into 30,000 points (I doubt this is probable), equity valuations will be attractive in long-term perspective.

Sunday, 29 March 2015

Meanwhile on the markets

The recent weeks brought some noteworthy developments on financial markets, some particularly worth highlighting and commenting on. Observations of how markets behave leads me to conclude my academic grasp of economic theorems is being rendered obsolete, while new paradigms unfold…

1. Interest rates

In early March Poland’s monetary authorities decreased the policy rate by 50 basis points, to (yet another) record-low 1.50%. In terms of historical levels of central bank’s rates, the current level appears hazardously low, however put into broader perspective, Poland’s monetary policy does not come out as extremely easy. Absolute level of interest rates is among the highest in the EU and oddly enough, real interest rates have not been that high since many years. Current real rate is around 3% (1.50% policy rate + 1.60% y/y deflation), while in the past years inflation-adjusted interest rates would not seldom run into negative territory. Do notice this reasoning bears some simplification, since inflation records are backward-looking while interest rates as of today refer to future periods and time mismatch exists.

The Polish central bank’s governor has also stressed there was no room for further monetary easing and over the coming months monetary authorities would take the “wait and see” approach. The only justification for such scale of monetary loosening is the ongoing deflation, which however is spurred by factors beyond central bank’s control. By slashing interest rates to record-low levels the central bank only adjusted its policy to evolution of price level in the economy (the question remains whether NBP would be capable of swiftly reacting to increasing inflation). Lower interest rates will not kick-start the economy, as it is expanding in a healthy and sustainable pace, consumption will also not be much stimulated, since propensities to spend, save and borrow are driven by several other more meaningful factors than monetary policy. Consequently, the most aggrieved by the recent rate cut are depositors whose savings do not grow as fast as they would like to be.

The other group hit are banks. They “suffer” (i.e. fall short of their shareholders’ expectations towards profits reaped in Poland) because rate decrease is followed by drop in cap on interest rates they are allowed to charge borrowers which is 4 times central bank’s lending rate, now 4 times 2.50%, i.e. 10%. Evidently banks find several ways of circumventing the regulation. Quite recently I learnt an up-front fee for a cash loan is on average 10% these days. In practice it means if you want to borrow let’s say 10,000 PLN you either effectively have to borrow 11,000 (and pay interest on it) or effectively get only 9,000 (but pay interest on 10,000). Banks will pass the unfavourable impact of monetary policy to their clients, as they will do with an increased deposit insurance fund contribution. The fund, intact between 2001 and 2014, has been recently depleted by 3 billion PLN to fund payments to depositors who had entrusted their money to insolvent credit unions (since October 2012 covered by deposit insurance system and the same rules of financial supervision as banks). The fraudulent activity of credit unions has been harnessed for full-blown mud-slinging in the current presidential campaign, yet this is a topic for another post…

Worth also mentioning the financial watchdog issued a warning to banks against evaluating mortgage loan applicants creditworthiness based on current interest rates and show clients stress simulations, i.e. how their instalments would rise if interest rates increased by a specific number of basis points. A commendable move, given currently granted mortgage loans could turn out to be a time bomb akin to CHF-denominated mortgages foisted upon client when the Swiss France cost not much above 2 PLN. Seven years ago Polish central bank’s policy rate was 6%. Unless a new paradigm emerges (i.e. interest rates higher than zero being an abnormal phenomenon), return of interest rates to such level within 25 or 30 years when mortgage loan is to be repaid, is definitely conceivable.

2. Stock market

Since taking up the job with the New Factory I am subject to stringent restrictions on trading, hence in order to avoid requesting approval for each single transaction, reporting transactions ex-post after each trade, reporting not executed trades and submitting breakdowns of orders and transactions at the end of each reporting period, I terminated my brokerage account and spare myself adrenaline by putting all my money into saving accounts and term deposits.

WIG, the broad market index covering almost the entire universe of stocks listed on Warsaw Stock Exchange, performed quite well in the first quarter of this year. It must be noted this index is a total return index, i.e. takes into account dividend income, in contrast to for instance WIG20, covering 20 biggest in terms of market capitalisation companies on WSE.
For this index I deliberately have chosen 10Y time interval for comparison, to illustrate for over two years the index has been in a clearly sideways trend. WIG20 is a price index, hence its readouts fail to reflect dividend income distributed to shareholders, which may make up a large portion of income, since many of index’s components are state-controlled cash cows whose dividends are a vital source of money to the government budget. Yet the chart clearly indicates those who invested in the index portfolio four years ago might not have broken even, even despite reaping several generous dividends.

Conclusions: the discrepancy between broad-market WIG index and blue-chip WIG20 index reflects not only differences in calculation formula but also the fact smaller companies outperform larger. WIG is hence a better business cycle gauge, yet not only because of its width. WIG20 composition is quite specific and not well-diversified. Banks have a large weight in the index, besides mining, oil and gas and electricity are strongly represented in the WIG20, making the index undesirably reliant on sentiments in a few industries and to regulatory and market environment having substantial impact on earnings of companies underlying the index.

3. Currency market

USD/PLN, here the pair purposely presented over 10Y horizon, has recently hit its 10-year high of 3.95 (some 0.05 higher than in memorable February 2009). The psychological barrier of 4.00 has not been even neared. Unlike six years ago, it was not the weakness of Polish zloty, but the strength of the US currency that drove USD/PLN quotations to exorbitantly high levels.

Polish currency recently has been amazingly stable as never before in its history which is well illustrated by EUR/PLN quotations. For more than two years, EUR/PLN has not broken out of quite narrow range from 4.00 to 4.30, while most of the time it stayed between 4.10 and 4.20. Such volatility is characteristic for mature markets. What also needs to be underlined, level on which the exchange rate has stabilised is neutral for the Polish economy, i.e. it well strikes balance between ensuring competitiveness of Polish exports and fending off prohibitive prices of imported goods. The issue of EUR adoption in Poland is also intensively exploited in the presidential campaign.

The divergence between skyrocketing USD/PLN and fairly stable EUR/PLN must lie on cross pair, EUR/USD. Quotes of the most liquid currency pair in the world dropped for a moment below 1.05 in the second week of March, thus also hitting 10Y low and then bounced back, yet remain below 1.10. The quaint FX rate movement reflects relative strength of the US economy and imminent monetary tightening (although Fed’s declaration interest rates will not be jacked up very soon brought appreciation of USD to a halt) as well as doldrums in which the EU economy is, compounded by increased scale of quantitative easing pursued by the ECB.

And for the very end, CHF/PLN quotations for which in my view the most relevant period for observation is three months. After shooting up on 15 January 2015, the Swiss currency slowly depreciated and CHF/PLN levelled off around 3.90, some 8% higher than before the SNB spun its currency out of control. For the indebted in CHF, impact of rising CHF/PLN has been well offset by negative LIBOR (currently near –0.85%) Polish banking sector’s concerted spread decrease (banks have not done it off their own bat, but have been coerced by financial sector watchdog). Mortgage debts of many households are now some 8% higher than in late 2014, yet their monthly debt service cash flow has not been hit.

4. Commodities

For sake of brevity I will focus only on crude oil prices that were searching for trough in second and third decade of January 2015. The subsequent rebound was a typical reaction of speculators to clearly oversold market. The scale of incline in the first half of February 2015 was impressive, since Brent oil price went up by some 30% within two weeks. In March oil quotations were very volatile, best proven by price fluctuations over the last two trading days. On 26 March oil went up by 5% in the wake of news of military action in Yemen to retreat by 5% on 27 March and wipe out almost the whole price increase from the previous day.

The question which naturally comes up these days is where the markets are heading. The only answer that naturally comes up to my mind is “I have no idea”. The most intensive period of my study of economics fell into 2008-2010, the run-up to the financial crisis, its most severe phase and early recovery. Near-zero interest rates at that time were considered a temporary measure employed to buoy up economies. Today, after six and a half years of ultra-loose monetary policies and no prospect of returning to long-term average levels of interest rates in developed economies one should ask what the current level of neutral interest rate in Taylor rule equation is.

I cannot even tell you in which phase of the traditionally defined business cycle we are. In Poland in 2000s we could witness recovery, early upswing, late upswing and downturn, in second half of 2009 we saw recovery, late upswing was in 2011, then the Polish economy slowed to record sluggish growth in 1Q2013. Are we now in early upswing or in late upswing? Needless to say, with hindsight it is easier to judge. But if we bear in mind stock market is said to be good indicator of future trends in the economy and it has been flat or mildly rising in the past months, economic growth should slightly accelerate. Economists’ forecasts in unison foresee a period of flat, but stable growth of 3% - 4% until 2017. Overly optimistic? Economists’ dreams of smoothed out business cycle fluctuations coming true? Time will only tell. One thing I am pretty sure of is that there might be many external shocks which may shatter all plausible projections. Keep the faith though.

Sunday, 19 January 2014

Safe bets on stock market?

Risk-averse investors tend to put all their money into safe instruments – mainly bank deposits and government bonds. The stock market, on account of its characteristics, exposes investors to much bigger variability of returns, tempting with gains much higher than on bank deposits, but also scaring away with prospects of losses that can wipe out large chunks of invested capital.

Risk profile of investments in equities is not homogenous. The two factors affecting the risk undertaken by an investor are, in my opinion: type of security an investor trades in and timing of transactions.

As for the former, the risk, commonly measured by volatility of returns, is lower for: bigger (blue-chips), counter-cyclical (sectors such as telecommunication or utilities) and sound (i.e. not grappling with financial difficulties) companies. The low-risk stocks usually are said to be a good-quality equity investments and offer expected return a few percentage points above risk-free rate and relatively low standard deviation of returns.

In the case of the latter, the issue is far more interesting. In terms of risk, timing of trade might matter more than other characteristics of an asset. You may pick out an excellent security, with absolutely firm fundamentals, no skeleton in the cupboard, etc. and lose money on the investment, if you pay over the odds. This is what happened to investors who were buying shares of sound IT or telecom companies at the peak of dot-com bubble in late 1999 / early 2000 and lost over 90% of invested capital. The companies whose stocks were trading at sky-high levels are still alive and generate profits, but fourteen years ago were… mispriced.

Now let’s consider two concepts essential in comprehending what I am getting at – the value and the price.

There are plenty of definitions of value put forward by economics academics, in my consideration I will narrow down to only one – the intrinsic value, or fundamental value, which is to some extent objectively justified by characteristic features of an asset. In the case of a share of a company, it is primarily determined by the company’s capacity to generate income to its owner, or in simplest words, to make profits. In valuation theory, a company is worth as much as discounted stream of positive cash flows it can generate to its equityholders.

The price, in turn, is the amount of money one party (a buyer) pays to another party (a seller) when they trade in an asset. The price is driven by several factors, including two of utmost importance – demand and supply. For a stock-listed security, a price is technically set by forces of demand and supply and most of the time (except for extreme cases when trading is on hold to prevent extreme movements) reflects the balance between supply and demand, which in turn is unstable over time. If supply exceeds demand, the equilibrium goes down, if the opposite holds, the equilibrium goes up.

It has to be underlined price does not have to equal value. In the long run, if a market is efficient, the equation above should hold true. In the shorter run deviations are very likely to occur and, if discernible and evident, can be exploited to earn.

Let’s look at two examples from the Polish stock market.

First days of September 2013. The Polish government unfolds its plan to curtail operations of private-run pension funds operating under the public pension system. Market participants react with panic sell-off. Let’s examine the motives / rationale behind the sell-off. This could have been an act of revenge of foreign financial institutions, whose risk-free business in Poland had just been undercut. 

The mini-crash could have also been sparked by fears that pension funds would dispose of some of the stocks they hold and that they would not generate additional demand for stocks in the future. The former argument could have served as incentive for speculators who could sell (short) stocks in order to buy them back at cheaper prices from pension funds. The latter theory was actually favourable for the stock market, as without artificial demand from pension funds, risk of overvaluation and market bubbles on Warsaw Stock Exchange diminishes.

A cool-headed analyst should ask a question, whether existence and scale of operations of private-run pension funds in Poland has any impact on fundamental value of stock-listed companies. For some financial services companies who deal with pension fund management, the answer could be affirmative, but for overwhelming majority of companies, dismantling of pension system has no impact on value. The conclusion is then simple – even if forces of supply and demand bring prices of some securities down, the situation creates investment opportunity – you can get the same value for lower price! A wise investor should grab such opportunity.

14 January 2014. Before trading commenced, Vattenfall announces it intends to dispose of its stake in Enea quickly. Trading opens 8% below previous day’s close, then the price of Enea slides further down, total 1-day loss reaches 14%. The accelerated book-building ends on the same day. The next day stocks of Enea rebound, yet still trade at discount to 13 January 2014 close. 

The rationale behind the sudden drop was the fear of increased supply of stocks from Vattenfall, or expectation if the stake is to change hands quickly, the vendor would have to accept a discount and market quotations would follow the price at which Vattenfall transacted with its counterparties. You could argue the price at which the vendor and several buyers agreed is an indicator of the company’s intrinsic value. I would counter-argue price in a fire sale is a poor valuation measure. Again, does the increased supply of stocks from Vattenfall affect income generation capacity of Enea? My answer is ‘no’. Does Vattenfall’s presence in Enea’s shareholder structure affect its income generation capacity? Given all facts and circumstances shaping the company’s operations, my answer is ‘no’ Again, probably the price deviated negatively from value. A shrewd investor should have grabbed this opportunity.

The strategy illustrated above is not foolproof though. There are 3 major traps an imprudent investor can fall into.

Firstly, you should be considerably confident the when price of a security plummets, it drops below its intrinsic value. Such sudden shock can occur as well when an asset is overpriced and its price is being abruptly adjusted towards the fundamental value. You have to carefully analyse the information that triggered the sell-off – maybe on second thoughts you realise it affects not only price but also value. Upward potential is then limited.

Secondly, the rebound might not be a matter of days. It might take weeks or months for a security to climb back to pre-plummet levels. In September 2013 losses of stockholders were quickly offset by subsequent gains, but it I would treat it as an exception that proves the rule. If you cannot accept the fact your money might be frozen for a few months before it fetches a decent profit, better give up on this strategy. Remember the market might stay irrational longer than you can stay liquid.

Thirdly, even if you are pretty sure you have just spotted an underpriced security and you will not need some portion of your money for a while, do not execute the strategy in one shot. Do not buy securities for all the cash you have at hand. Divide your holdings and be prepared to buy even more at even lower prices if the decline continues. Such approach reduces both potential gains if the price bounces back quickly, but can maximise them if the price keeps falling, as your average buy price also gets lower. Anyway, remember you are playing with turbulent market, so caution, cool head and restraint are advised.

Sunday, 1 December 2013

Are we in 2007?

If I could revisit 2008 in 2011, why not turning back time even more and returning to 2007? If you look at the S&P chart below, showing some period of 12 months from December to November, your guess should be that it dates back to good, pre-crisis times, while in fact it illustrates recent 12 months. No major correction, low volatility and over 30% return over the year is what stockholders on average experienced in 2013.


Such patterns are typical, but for the late expansion phase, in which GDP growth is high, unemployment runs low, inflationary pressures intensify and have to be dampened by monetary tightening. Such chart could also come from a period of early economic recovery, when stock prices bounce back after a dismal bear market. But the bear market actually has not occurred since early 2009. Since late winter of 2009, stock markets have been in the bullish phase, with some major corrections: in spring 2010 when bankruptcy of Greece was a real threat, in summer 2011 when US sovereign rating was downgraded, in spring 2012 (was there a profound reason for the downward movement?), but since then most markets have been rising without a deeper break to take a breath.

Is the incline sustainable?

Every why has a wherefore. Sound bull markets the history has witnessed were grounded in economic fundamentals – economies were expanding, fewer people were jobless, taxpayers paid more in taxes and governments ran nearly balanced budgets, wheels in the economic machines were oiled property and central banks kept interest rates on moderately high level to prevent economies from overheating and preclude inflation from going up. Now the economic growth rate in USA stays below 3%, Western Europe economies are rebounding after deep slowdown. Unemployment rate in the USA is above 7% (which is very higher given the flexibility of labour market there), in the eurozone it is above 10%. To combat adverse economic conditions, tremendously loose monetary policy has been pursued over last five year. Not only have the interest rates in the biggest economies have been cut to near zero, but many central banks have been carrying out quantitative easing programmes, or in plain English, increased money supply in financial system.

Normally when if money supply goes up, everything else held constant, price level should increase by the same rate, to keep the financial system in balance. To many economists’ surprise, ultra-loose monetary policy has not sent overall price level rising. The reason for it is simple – the money intended to prop up the real economy through the financial system have not flowed out of banks and drove up asset prices.

Long ago it has been discovered that low interest rates distort economic decisions. The upshots are now visible on stock and property markets in many countries. House prices in the United States and in Great Britain have seen double-digit increases over the last year. Is this trend sustainable?

I keep asking myself a question: “why so good, if so bad?” Why are the markets red-hot if the economy is still fragile? The only plausible explanation is that market participant are buying the prospects of bright future. But can the next years be rose-coloured, if financial markets rely on drip of cheap money provided by central bankers? Near-zero interest rates cannot be kept forever. One day central bankers will have to bite a bullet on it and what then? The biggest corrections in the recent months on the stock market have been brought about by rumours of QE being tapered or petering out in near future. Central bankers realise the scale of pathological reliance of markets on monetary easing and the difficulty they have to get to grips with is how to pull out of the egregious practice of printing money without harming the markets, as the shock suffered by them would be transmitted into real economy. This dilemma niftily depicts the abnormality of current situation. In ‘normal’ environment raising the cost of credit above certain level just stifles economic activity and dampens enthusiasm of financial markets’ participants. At the present, leaving cost of credit on historically low levels, but only curtailing pumping money may wreak bigger havoc to financial system than unexpected jacking up interest rates by 100 points in a healthy economy.

Quite frequently you can hear of economists arguing, whether the recent unfettered stock market rally is a full-blown bubble, or it only has all makings of a bubble. Federal Reserve has already received a warning. Many indicators (P/E > 25, margin debt, bullish sentiment, low volatility, technical indicators) point at existence of a bubble, while other (business cycle phase, low participation of individuals in the market) may disprove the bubble theory. I only wish to stress the presence of the word “bubble” in the media and in the search engines might be a misleading gauge and should be interpreted with caution.

According to the scenario in the paper linked above, the crash is very likely to occur in 2014. If so, I foresee it will not strike out of the blue, but the show will go on in the ordinary way. At some point stock market reaches its peak, then retreats, attempts of bullish speculators to drive prices up go in vain, then ensues the waterfall (shape of a price chart when prices plummet), then a rebound, then a gradual decline and at the end the tsunami strikes… This pattern is similar to what was observed in 2008 (peak in 2007, retreat, waterfall in early 2008, decline till the early days of September 2008 and then the Lehman earthquake). The first and foremost argument against such scenario is that financial system is not full of toxic assets as it was before the crisis. On the other hand, central banks and government have run out of tools the used to rescue financial institutions and economies in 2008 and 2009. Fhe frail economies cannot endlessly underlie exorbitant stock market valuations and the sooner market participant realise it, the better for everyone.

These musings take me back to the last semester of my studies, when in late 2010 I took a course “Financial crises and financial stability”, delivered by prof. Mieczysław Puławski. I recall well the lecturer mentioning a crisis model devised in 2009, according to which a much more wrathful crisis will hit in 2H2014. Time will tell, if the prophets’ of doom prediction was right.

A few paragraphs above I stated “financial markets rely on drip of cheap money” and laid my thought out very precisely – financial markets, not real economies. Real economies are capable of bearing the burden of higher cost of credit, it may bend them, but will not knock them down and in the long run sound monetary policy will lay foundations for returning to the path of sustainable economic growth.

Compared to developed markets, Poland comes out impressively safe. The property market has been on decline since 2008. In 3Q2013 property prices nudged up, yet it is too early to judge, whether the trend has reversed, or the rebound is just a correction in a downward trend. Unquestionably, the increased demand for properties is the effect of lower interest rates and constricting regulation regarding buyer’s equity for property purchase (min. 5% in 2014, this one hastened many buyers finance the planned transactions with 100% mortgage this year). One swallow does not make a summer and it will be the summer of 2014 when with hindsight the mid-term trend on Polish property market can be observed.

The Polish stock market has been consistently underperforming developed markets. While S&P 500 and DAX indices are well above their 2007 peaks, WIG (broad market total return index) and WIG20 (blue chip price index) are not only below their 2007 peaks, but also below their highs recorded in first half of 2011. Market analyst put it down to insecurity over future of pension system in Poland. If this is indeed the case, it only bears out the reform is a step in the right direction. Despite not beating ever-time records, the stock market in Poland is red-hot, judging by IPO frequency and successfulness. 4Q2013 already saw privatisation of PKP Cargo, which was priced quite high and debuted at absurdly high price. I subscribed for shares of PKP Cargo, took the 19% profit and made off. Recently I subscribed for Newag, just for fun I signed up for 50 shares, 19 PLN each. On Friday I discovered I had been allocated mere 4 shares, as individual investors’ demand surpassed supply over 25 times, which resulted in 93% haircut in share allocation… Demand for Energa among individual investors is also record-high and over-subscription is expected. I will subscribe for those shares as well, hoping to find the greater fool to buy them from it on secondary market. I realise this has become a fad and market sentiment clearly indicates I should rush to escape.

My strategy is to liquidate my stocks portfolio in first weeks of 2014. I last bought stocks in early September 2013, when pension reform announcement triggered a short-lasting sell-off, which turned out to be a superb mid-term investment opportunity. The only reason why I have not pulled out of the stock market recently is the sizeable loss from hapless 2011 which is carried forward into next years. According to Polish tax regulations, no more than 50% of a loss from a specific year may be used as tax shield in any of next following year, so this year (in 2012 my profit was very small) I cannot use it up and sale of securities in 2014 offers a chance to reduce capital gains tax payable. And after I scram, may it all collapse. By all accounts, Poland’s economy will not be severely impacted by the downturn on financial markets and subsequent bear market might offer interesting long-term investment opportunities.